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Neurobiologists (Neurons) versus the
Cognitive Neuroscientists (Cognition)
Cell Biologists (Cells) versus the
Physiologists (Organs/Organ Systems) 




Listed above are simplified descrip-
tions of several past and current debates in
the biological sciences. The points of
departure in these conflicts lie not only in
defining what the appropriate question is,
but also in differences in approach to
understanding certain phenomena. Such
debates involve politics, can become per-
sonal and, consequently, can accumulate
baggage that has little to do with the sci-
ence itself. Notwithstanding, debate is
understood to be an integral part of scien-
tific progress, and a product of different
perspectives and areas of expertise con-
verging on large scientific questions. What
the listed debates have in common are dif-
ferences in the sizes of the units of study
(the unit in parentheses) — in each sce-
nario the first group of scientists study
phenomena at a smaller scale than their
opponents.
REDUCTIONISM’S MAIN EVENT
The flagship example of a scientific
debate is perhaps the most visible debate
in the history of science, that surrounding
the origins of life on earth and, more con-
tentiously, the origin of Homo sapiens.
This debate is commonly labeled with
terms such as “Creationism” and
“Darwinism,” but those who investigate
further find that some of the most sophis-
ticated arguments regarding evolution
occur not between evolutionists and non-
evolutionists but between the differing
evolutionist factions engaged in a major
sub-debate over how to study biological
evolution most effectively. 
In one corner of this sub-debate lie the
“Ultra-Darwinists,” comprised of biolo-
gists who generally point to natural selec-
tion as being responsible for the vast
majority, if not all, of the variation we
observe in organisms, both extant and in
the fossil record. Their strategy involves
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followed by the construction of a model to
explain how that characteristic evolved by
natural selection, meaning that the trait
conferred a reproductive benefit to that
species in an ancient environment. John
Maynard Smith and Richard Dawkins
have been two of the many famous partic-
ipants in this branch of evolutionary think-
ing and have put forth decades of convinc-
ing arguments on its behalf. Those who
practice the more modern field of evolu-
tionary psychology borrowed from this
branch of evolutionary thinking [1]. 
The opposing side does not possess a
readily identifiable label, but it’s fair to
say that their views are in stark contrast to
those of the Ultra-Darwinists.
Interestingly, they are every bit as evolu-
tionist as the Ultra-Darwinists in their
belief in the omnipotence of natural selec-
tion in explaining the origin, expansion,
and existence of life on earth in lieu of any
supernatural force. What they disagree on
is the amount of biological variation that
natural selection has crafted, as they often
emphasize that other non-Darwinian
forces can be very instrumental in creating
the observable traits in many organisms.
The late Stephen Jay Gould and many oth-
ers popularized this wing of evolutionary
polemic [2]. 
What is noteworthy in this example is
the underlying similarity between this and
many other debates, including those sum-
marized at the introduction. They find a
common theme, that of the appropriate-
ness in the application of reductionism —
the belief “that the higher levels of inte-
gration of a complex system can be fully
explained through a knowledge of the
smallest components” as expressed by
Ernst Mayr [3]. 
THE “LEAP” METAPHOR 
Reductionism works best when the
problem needing reduction isn’t intuitive-
ly far removed from the modern methods
and understanding needed to solve the
problem. When a sickle cell anemia
patient undergoes a characteristically
painful episode, we “reduce” the episode
by switching on a microscope and observ-
ing the abnormal shape of the patients’
erythrocytes. We further “reduce” the
episode by observing properties of the
hemoglobin molecule responsible for the
abnormal function of diseased erythro-
cytes. We are successful in this instance
because the answers we seek are clear and
conspicuous. This is much different than
describing sickle cell anemia symptoms in
terms of quarks or superstrings, for
instance. Trying to describe erythrocyte
structural abnormalities in these terms
would be nonsensical, because the “leap”
between sickle cell anemia and quantum
physics is, at the present time, too large.
The intuitive connection between sickle
cell anemia and a genetic mutation, on the
other hand, is well within the scope of our
current technology and understanding.
We use the metaphor of the “leap” to
describe the connection between phenom-
enon and mode of explanation, because
that is exactly what an effort at “reducing”
a scientific explanation involves: taking a
step from one place to another. We know
how to walk and where each step will
land, how it will feel, and because of this
sureness we can estimate how far each
step will go. The suspenseful aspect of a
leap is that the further the distance, the
more uncertain one is about landing effec-
tively. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, knowing
one’s footing, leaping capability, and
exactly where one needs to leap, increases
the probability for a successful leap. For
instance, our thorough understanding of
the structure and properties of hemoglobin
and our knowledge of the symptoms that
the sickle cell anemia patient suffers
increases the chance that the connection
drawn between the two is a valid one.
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ject to this “weakest link” syndrome:
Charles Darwin, despite understanding the
role of heredity in natural selection, mis-
understood genetics, which was responsi-
ble for his inability to complete the link
between genetics and evolution [4]. As
intrigued as many of us are by super-
strings, physicists barely know enough
about them to describe sub-atomic parti-
cles, let alone sickle cell anemia. When we
don’t agree on the avenue towards expla-
nation, we cannot arrive at an explanation.




A classically contentious area of sci-
ence where reductionism has simultane-
ously gained champions and detractors is
in the realm of human behavior and, more
specifically, behavioral genetics. Some
might argue that we as a society, for exam-
ple, feel far more comfortable discussing
why a young girl “has her mother’s eyes,”
than we do the possibility that she has her
“father’s temper.” The discomfort is often
blamed on societal efforts of being “polit-
ically correct,” a fear that biology might
tell us something contrary to our assump-
tions, how we view ourselves, and how
society is currently run [5]. This is the
result of an overall ugly scientific past in
the science of human behavior, a field of
science that has harbored some of history’s
most vaunted exercises in scientific fool-
ery. 
This questionable past has caused
many to approach modern behavioral sci-
ence with heavy suspicion. Some might
argue that it is time for us, as both a scien-
tific community and society at large, to
move ahead and embrace the biological
frontiers of the behavioral sciences,
because ultimately we benefit in countless
ways from knowing how our biology
impacts our behavior.
Reductionism applied to behavior
does have some merit. Strikingly, we are
learning more about the biological and
genetic roots of diseases like schizophre-
nia and possibly autism [6]. Several stud-
ies once argued that carrying an extra Y
chromosome led to relatively aggressive
behavior in the some of the carriers [7]. In
other behavioral abnormalities, the “leap”
between agent and behavior can be even
simpler; we understand why cocaine is
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Figure 1. A successful Reductionist
leap. The scientist in the figure has a clear
understanding of what he/she is asking: in
this case: “What is Sickle Cell Anemia?”
Sickle cell anemia is a disease with con-
spicuous symptoms that follows a
Mendelian pattern of inheritance. The tools
used to answer a question comprise the
footing of the reductionist leap. The leap
distance is how close pillar A is to pillar B,
meaning how well the acumen in pillar A
can answer the question posed in pillar B.
The closer the distance, the better chance
for a successful reductionist leap.addictive and why too much ethyl alcohol
can contribute to drunkenness through the
study of receptors and neural synapses. We
know how Homo sapiens behave when
they have too much to drink. If inebriation
presented as mild fatigue, we wouldn’t
know what to look for, which would
muddy the preciseness of its study.
Impreciseness of study has higher
stakes in the biology of behavior than in
other fields of science. While a misstep in
application of superstring theory can lead
to the incorrect calculation of the physical
properties of a subatomic particle, a mis-
step in the behavioral sciences has ramifi-
cations far greater. Society looks to the
behavioral sciences for insight, because it
is here that society searches for a ground
zero of moral judgments, which often are
crystallized into its laws. For example, if
biology refutes the claim that “refrigerator
mothers” are the cause of autism, then no
longer can society, or the law, confidently
blame mothers for that condition [8].
Indeed, in the behavioral sciences,
overzealous applications of reductionist
thinking deserve special attention and,
where it is abused, heavy criticism.
THE NAÏVE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENTIST
The reality is that most human behav-
ioral disorders don’t present with symp-
toms as conspicuous as hallucination. The
vast majority of behavioral disorders have
symptoms that are so subjective that one
would be wise to question the existence of
a specific “behavior” at all. We’ll con-
struct a hypothetical example that illumi-
nates this problem: a young scientist inter-
ested in the existence of a gene or set of
genes for “deviant behavior.” The problem
arises in defining what exactly “deviant
behavior” is and exactly where  one looks
for people with this gene.
Let us place ourselves in the shoes of
this behavioral researcher as he battles his
conscience. We’ll outline his thought
process and demonstrate how hubris leads
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Figure 2. “Too far away.” This occurs when the means to understanding a problem is too
removed, intuitively, to lead to a helpful explanation. In this example, superstring theory is
called upon to explain a medical condition. Superstring theory has come a long way in
sophistication, but not nearly enough to explain macro phenomena like sickle cell anemia. to frustration in attempting to sort out how
to study a “deviance gene.” This example
is not intended to serve as a straw man to
debate against the specific case of a gene
for deviant behavior but instead to provide
a detailed example of the ways in which
reductionist thinking is vulnerable to mis-
steps. 
We, the behavioral scientists, under-
stand that in most large-scale genetic stud-
ies a substantial sample size of affected
and unaffected individuals is required to
trace the origin of a gene. Our first task
then is to isolate a population where our
“deviance gene” might be present in high-
er frequency than normal. This is similar
to a scenario where, if we were interested
in genetic determinants for high blood
pressure, we might survey several cardiol-
ogy clinics because carriers of a “high
blood pressure gene” should be more
prone to suffer from heart problems than
the average person. In the case of
deviance, the world provides us a parallel
to the cardiology clinic in the prison sys-
tem, which is populated by people whose
behavior deviated from that which their
larger society deems appropriate. 
This logic appears sound until we
notice that the deviant behavior leading to
incarceration runs the gamut of the human
behavioral spectrum. One could argue that
the only connection between an incarcerat-
ed murderer and a marijuana peddler is
their presence in prison. We continue that
train of thought and ask ourselves what
these other groups of criminals might have
in common: rapist and a petty thief; a
repeat DWI offender and a computer hack-
er; a con man and an inner-city gang mem-
ber. The only common gene one might
find in this population would be a gene for
violating a federal, state, or local law. That
being the case, Leona Helmsley would
have the gene and apparently so would
Martha Stewart. Obviously, the search for
a deviance gene in a broad sense is unhelp-
ful. We need to be more specific.
We convince ourselves that the
“deviance gene” shouldn’t be present in
people who commit their acts for scrupu-
lous purposes. We sigh in relief because
we’ve escaped the first potentially con-
founding hurdle and now have a rationale
to eliminate, for example, politicians who
break the law, from our study. We say to
ourselves:  Maybe the gene we are in
search of codes for behavioral disloyalty
towards a larger society? Is it a gene for
low moral threshold, societal non-confor-
mity? It certainly seems to make sense.
Criminals, after all, did do a poor job of
conforming.
We take this thinking to a county jail
and interview incarcerated young people
who speak, amongst other things, of the
gang structure that exists in prisons and in
America’s cities. Many incarcerated per-
sons are members of gangs in prisons and
some of the most disturbing violence is on
account of gang rivalries [9]. We decode to
focus on gangs because they exist both
within and outside of prisons, and there-
fore, could be a target population for our
study. We interview several prisoners and
urban gang members and think we are on
the right track. Many of those we inter-
view seem deeply disturbed and have
taken part in destructive violence. We
think we’ve isolated our target group for
deviance. 
A disturbing thought overcomes us as
we ponder our interview data, pertaining
to what the data communicate about the
gang structure that many incarcerated
young people are a part of — we seem to
have underestimated the sophistication of
gang structure. We ask ourselves: Are
gangs the appropriate place to search for
“deviant” behaviors? Aren’t the inner-city
gangs of the United States troubling insti-
tutions specifically because the kids who
join them are loyal? Aren’t gangs a large
problem because kids do conform to them
and their rules? Isn’t that what makes
them bad? Is it the fact that they are col-
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laws of their own? Members often pay
duty and will give and take a life in the
name of their institution [9]. If anything,
gang members are too loyal. Violence
often occurs on the basis of this loyalty to
their peer group. 
We stumble through this apparent
hurdle, but are rescued when we tell our-
selves the following:
The gang members’ loyalty is not for
constructive purposes, but for destructive
purposes. So maybe our gene is for
“destructive deviance” and not solely for
deviance.
But further discomfort follows this
declaration, as we admit that most of the
people in prison, including many who
have committed violent crimes, involve
behavior and crimes committed in pursuit
of wealth. Much of the imprisoned popula-
tion simply used illegal means to attaining
the wealth. Crack cocaine dealers don’t
seem to risk their freedom and lives on
inner-city corners because it’s fun, they
likely believe the risk worth the financial
return. 
With our pride still intact, we attempt
to move forward. We try to localize our
search, to eliminate Martha Stewart from
our study as we note that obviously she is
different than the inner-city drug dealer.
We think we’ve found an escape by saying
that perhaps violent criminals are what we
are looking for. The problem is that focus-
ing on violence eliminates nearly half of
the imprisoned population in many states
who are incarcerated for non-violent
crimes [10]. 
We decide to pursue the violent
aspects to deviance, as it seems a bit more
conspicuous, and, therefore, more
amenable to study. In the process, we are
forced to admit several things: Yes, the
gang member from East Los Angeles does
display loyal behavior, and yes, this loyal
behavior might be at the root of the gang
problem in American inner-cities. They
are loyal. They kill, and are willing to be
killed, for a purpose. They kill not in the
name of dollars alone, but in the name of
a gang, which is often a street or section of
some neighborhood, a highly immaterial
entity requiring manufactured allegiance.
Unfortunately, we realize that the
same adjectives could easily be applied to
a soldier fighting in any given war, people
who are not incarcerated, not criminals,
and by most standards, not deviant.
We elaborate on this thought. A pri-
vate in the United States Marines fights
and kills on orders from persons with
higher authority, people who are general-
ly not family members, with allegiance
that is manufactured. A motivation other
than monetary gain drives many brave
deeds, but respect, honor, and belief in the
cause being fought are necessary; hence,
the discipline and drilling involved in most
military training. 
We become uncomfortable with this
parallel, because sadly, we cannot tease
apart the urban gang member from the fic-
tional “Private Ryan.” We continue: Both
gang members and Marine privates com-
mit startling acts of bravery. The differ-
ence lay in that the private’s acts are legal
under the United States Constitution,
while the gang members’ acts are illegal
under local and federal law. 
Unless there is a gene for obeying the
United States Constitution we are forced
to admit that, cognitively, the Marine
Private and gang member might engage in
very similar behavior. We speak on the
perspective of the brain: 
As far as the brain is concerned,
unloading a Glock-9 at a rival gang mem-
ber who is on one’s “turf” might not be
much different than a soldier firing rounds
from an AK-47 at platoon of Vietcong
guerillas during the Vietnam War. In both
cases the goal is to end the life of another
person, in the name of an allegiance to
some entity, group, or collective. Neither
the gang member nor the U.S. soldier is
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ciple, because they were told to and
because they feel that the killing has a
moral justification.
With this understanding, we return to
the original focus of our study, the
“deviance gene.” We remember, however,
that we were misled earlier, because if
“deviance” is defined by breaking the law,
then Pete Rose might be just as likely to
carry the gene as the modern day Al
Capone. This isn’t a comforting thought. 
We tell ourselves no, Pete Rose does
not have the “violent” aspect to the
“deviance gene” and begin to suspect that
the gene we are in search of is a “violence-
deviance” hybrid. We sit on that thought for
a minute but soon realize that we are begin-
ning to make a fatal logical error common
in biology: trying to craft the genes around
what we are trying to prove and not crafting
what we are trying to prove around the
actual existence of genes responsible. At
this rate of lazy intra-polemic we’ll need a
“bank-robber gene,” right next to the “drug
dealer on Linden Boulevard gene,” with the
“con man gene” on the next chromosome.
We are forced to chuckle at our hubris, and
move on.
In the course of our study, we are
finding that the search for a “deviance
gene” is loaded with many other contra-
dictions and confounding loopholes. What
we are also finding is that in studies like
these, separating the moral from the scien-
tific isn’t easy; an oil tycoon and a cocaine
drug kingpin might actually have a lot in
common, cognitively. The fact that one
gains wealth legally and the other illegally
says nothing for a biological and, there-
fore, genetic difference between the two of
them. Reluctantly, we decide to put the
study aside for a few days and go back to
the drawing board. 
REDUCING REDUCTIONISM
The situation in Figure 3 below out-
lines an error in misidentification of the
parent problem in a reductionist appeal. In
this case we have no idea where to look for
a “deviance gene” and which populations
to screen, because we realize that the
notion of “deviant behavior” is far too sub-
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Figure 3. “Imprecise destination.”
The behavioral scientist in the figure
is unsure of where to leap. The pillar
A contains the tools that will be called
upon to answer the question in pillar
B. In this situation, the acumen in pil-
lar A can be infinitely sophisticated,
yet the question posed in pillar B
cannot be properly located and,
therefore, cannot be answered. jective to merit a helpful genetic study, as
our genes don’t magically fit behaviors for
the sake of publication. Interestingly,
deviant behavior is hardly the only behav-
ior where searching for a genetic source
runs into the outlined roadblocks.
Deviance is no more prone to the outlined
missteps than any other well studied
human behavior. Intelligence, the prince
of debated human behavioral characteris-
tics, finds at least as many barriers to a
consensus understanding. Both deviance
and intellect were, after all, two of the cor-
nerstone targets of the eugenics move-
ment, and thousands of people were steril-
ized on the suspicion or belief that they
harbored biology that predisposed them to
deviant behavior or inferior intellect [11].
The truth is that there are likely very
few labs in the world dedicated to studying
the genetics of “deviance” specifically,
and amongst those, it is likely that they
have a better grasp on the problem than the
outlined “Naïve Behavioral Scientist.”
That example was used solely to illustrate
how the study of human behavior is par-
ticularly vulnerable to overzealousness,
the type that is typical of misappropriated
reductionist thinking.
One could trace the abuse of reduc-
tionist thinking to societal and profession-
al pressures; any amount of data linking
large complex phenomena to smaller,
more manageable phenomena is going to
be explored because in the dynamic insti-
tutions that are human societies, we appre-
ciate anything that can be written in stone
such that we can feel comfortable making
a moral judgment. For example, in the
case of autism, the “refrigerator mothers”
explanation was simpler to understand,
and perhaps easier to deal with, than a
complex gene-environment interaction
that we are still likely decades away from
fully decoding.
With its potential for error, one might
ask about the future of reductionist think-
ing in the behavioral sciences — are its
flaws just a necessary outgrowth of its suc-
cesses? Recently, the same genetic muta-
tions have been shown to play a role in
vastly different psychiatric disorders, fur-
ther clouding the relationship between
genetics and psychopathology [13].
Surely, if the genetic boundaries are
unclear between behaviors that appear as
different as manic depression and schizo-
phrenia, we can expect behaviors that we
diagnose legally, like deviance, to be at
least as complex in biological underpin-
ning, assuming there is a specific biologi-
cal underpinning.
Indeed, questioning existing dogma
can only improve our understanding, but
we certainly don’t want a world totally
bereft of reductionist thinking. Successful
reductionist “leaps” have benefited
humankind and the world in countless
ways. It’s not reductionism, per se, but the
distance between the pillars that might
need re-evaluation. Maybe science can
learn that, in addition to being humbling,
complexity is as intriguing as simplicity.
This is a lesson that the human genome
project has taught the world. Only a few
years, ago many believed that a complete
human genome sequence was the crown
jewel of biology and that the sequence
alone was the key to understanding life.
This is no longer the case, as the scientific
community now speaks of a “transcrip-
tome,” “proteome,” and “kinome,” all rep-
resenting pillars of understanding between
an inert sequence of nucleic acids (the
genome) and us as living, metabolizing,
human beings. This has engendered a par-
adigm shift in the way biology is dis-
cussed: simply screaming out “A Gene for
Cancer,” for example, no longer means
very much. Biomedical research now
understands the importance of what goes
on in between the gene and the cancer,
between the genes and phenotypes. And as
far as the behavioral sciences go, moral
judgments might have to be made without
the aid of biology. Maybe science simply
108 Ogbunugafor: Reductionism in biologyisn’t equipped to fill all of the gaps, make
all the “leaps” we want it to make. 
Making moral judgments without the
aid of biology is a not a task that society
should fear, as this apparent quandary
highlights one of the defining characteris-
tics of our species: the ability to craft a
seemingly infinite array of personalities
and psychologies from a finite genetic
palette. Society needs only to learn to be
satisfied with the very modest, yet enor-
mously helpful, “leaps” that scientific
knowledge can provide us, that do not
build our world for us, nor tell us what is
right from wrong, but give us a founda-
tion, however small, upon which to build
society. 
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